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The ideological and political roots of American inequality
1.  Three arguments for inequality
To address properly the growing inequality in the advanced democracies, particularly in the United States 
but also increasingly in the UK and continental Europe, I believe it is necessary to review the main arguments for 
inequality, and to inquire into their legitimacy. There are, today, two main arguments for inequality: ﬁ  rst, an ethical 
one, that individuals deserve to beneﬁ  t from what nature and nurture endows them with, and second, an instrumen-
tal one, that inequality is good for everyone. The ﬁ  rst argument is presented in its most compelling form by the 
philosopher Robert Nozick, who in his 1974 book, Anarchy, State and Utopia, advanced the idea that a person has 
a right to own himself and his powers, and to beneﬁ  t by virtue of any good luck that may befall him, such as the 
luck of being born into a rich family, or in a rich nation. Any voluntary exchanges that take place between persons 
are legitimate, and in this way, it is not hard to imagine that a highly unequal distribution of income and wealth 
can be built up fairly rapidly from these unequal endowments. Nozick is the ﬁ  rst the admit that actual capitalist 
economies are not characterized by historical sequences of legitimate, voluntary exchanges: there is much coer-
cion, corruption, and theft in the history of all societies. But Nozick’s point is that one can imagine a capitalism 
with a clean history, in which vastly unequal endowments of wealth are built up entirely from exchanges between 
highly talented, well educated people and simple, unskilled ones, and this unequal result is ethically acceptable if 
one accepts the premise that one has a right to beneﬁ  t by virtue of one’s endowments – biological, familial, and 
social – or so he claims. 
The second major argument for inequality is the instrumental one: that only by allowing highly talented per-
sons to keep a large fraction of the wealth that they help in creating will that creativity ﬂ  ourish, which redounds 
to the beneﬁ  t of all, through what is informally called the trickle-down process. In a word, material incentives are 
necessary to engender the creativity in that small fraction of humanity who have the potential for it, and state in-
terventions, primarily through income taxation, which reduce those material rewards, will kill the goose that lays 
the golden eggs. 
A third argument for inequality, which is currently most prevalent in the United States, is one of futility: even if 
the degree of inequality that comes with laissez-faire is not socially necessary in the sense that the incentive argu-
ment claims, attempts by the state to reduce it will come to naught, because the government is grossly incompetent, 
inefﬁ  cient, or corrupt. Thus, better to let the rich keep their wealth and invest it proﬁ  tably, than to hope that the Page • 8
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state can manage it more fruitfully. Incredible as it may seem, it is now becoming increasingly popular in certain 
circles of economists in the United States to say that the productivity of government investment is zero.
Many in this audience – and I mean especially the Europeans – may think it somewhat pedantic for me to re-
hearse these views, which they consider to be self-evidently wrong or false. But I do so because these views have 
taken a strong hold on the minds of many Americans, and the consequences for the United States, and therefore for 
the world, will be dire, I believe, if this popular ideology is not successfully challenged. The United States is not 
Germany in 1931, but it may well be Germany in 1921 – I do not wish to push the analogy too far, because the US 
is not suffering under a punitive Versailles treaty. The details are quite different in the two periods, but the event of 
a right-wing populist movement growing in the United States to a dangerous degree has a non-trivial probability. 
It is incumbent upon us, as intellectuals, to equip ourselves to counter it.Page • 9
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2.  Philosophical responses
The philosophical response to Robert Nozick’s libertarianism came primarily from two political philosophers, 
John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. (My use of the word ‘response’ is somewhat anachronistic, as Rawls’s major 
book was published three years prior to Nozick’s.) Rawls maintained, contra Nozick, that the thesis of self-owner-
ship was not right – rather, that the distribution of many attributes of persons was, in his parlance, morally arbitrary, 
and hence the individual did not have a moral right to beneﬁ  t exclusively from their physical possession. Rawls 
certainly included among such attributes one’s biological endowment and the family and circumstances into which 
one was born. Rawls attempted to construct an argument that, if rational, self-interested beings were shielded from 
the knowledge of the luck they would sustain in the birth lottery, which assigns genes and families, they would opt 
for a highly equal distribution of wealth – indeed, for that distribution which maximizes the wealth that the poorest 
class of people would have. His main argument for this thesis was wrong – knowing decision theory would have 
helped Rawls – but nevertheless, many found the recommendation of the so-called ‘maximin allocation’ of income 
and wealth attractive, because they found the premise of the moral arbitrariness of the distribution of genetic and 
social assets attractive. 
The error in Rawls’s argument that those in an original position, behind a veil of ignorance, would choose a 
highly equal distribution of income, came from his assumption that the decision makers postulated to occupy this 
position were completely self-interested. Self-interested individuals may be willing to take some risk in the birth 
lottery – they may be willing to accept some possibility of an unlucky draw in return for the possibility of a lucky 
draw. So advocating a strongly equalizing tax system may not be in their interest – better perhaps to gamble on 
being lucky and not to have to pay a large tax to compensate the unlucky ones, in that event. This does not mean 
that a strongly equalizing tax system is ethically wrong: but to justify it with the kind of argument Rawls wished to 
construct requires that individuals care at least to some degree about others. Rawls’s attempt to derive equality of 
results from premises of rationality and self-interest fails. Granted, such a derivation, were it to be valid, would be 
compelling, but it is not valid. A stronger premise of empathy, altruism or solidarity is required to derive equality 
as an outcome in the Rawlsian framework.
 There was another aspect of Rawls’s theory that was unattractive to some: there was no evident place in it for 
the role of personal responsibility and accountable choice. Virtually all of us believe, to some degree at least, that 
individuals should be held responsible for their choices – we may insist that they be properly informed, provided 
with adequate education during youth, and so on, but there comes a point at which outcomes for individuals may Page • 10
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legitimately differ due to choice. Rawls gestured towards recognizing this kind of legitimate inequality when he 
called for equalizing primary goods, rather than income – but then he often said that income was the most impor-
tant of the primary goods. How, then, could he at once advocate equalizing bundles of primary goods and hold-
ing people responsible their choices of income – leisure bundles, preferences for which might legitimately differ 
across persons? 
Ronald Dworkin, in 1981, published a pair of articles which addressed this problem in a radical, new way. He 
advocated what he dubbed ‘resource equality,’ as opposed to both welfare equality and primary-goods equality. 
In Dworkin’s view, people should be held responsible for their preferences, but not for their resources – where 
resources include many of the goods that Rawls called morally arbitrary, such as genetic endowments and the 
social and familial circumstances of one’s childhood. This is not the place to go into detail about Dworkin’s recom-
mendation for redistribution: sufﬁ  ce to say that it called for compensating individuals for the bad luck of the birth 
lottery but holding them responsible for many of the choices they make as adults. Thus, a degree of equality was 
recommended that was less than Rawlsian, but far more than exists in most advanced democracies today. Perhaps 
the income distributions of the Nordic democracies are the closest approximation to a Dworkinian distribution.Page • 11
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3.  Economic theory
I wish to discuss both the inﬂ  uence of macro and micro economic theory on our views about inequality. I will 
dismiss macro-economic theory quite curtly. Its two pillars, rational expectations and the efﬁ  cient markets hypoth-
esis, have both been quite effectively demolished by the current ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis. 
Rational expectations is simply a premise of mathematical convenience. Suppose that agents are making deci-
sions under uncertainty, which is, of course, ubiquitous in the real world. Suppose, for example, each individual is 
deciding how much education to take, under an assumption about the probability distribution of wages associated 
with each level of education he/she might acquire. If one is interested in the long-run properties of such a process, 
one needs to make some assumption about the relationship between the prior distributions of wages conditional 
upon educational levels that people hold, and the actual distribution of wages which occurs after people are edu-
cated and acquire jobs. The simplest – and indeed, focal—assumption that one can make is that these distributions 
are the same: that is, people take, as their prior, the distribution that is in fact realized. This is the rational expecta-
tions hypothesis. Although mathematically convenient as a way of closing the model, the assumption is impossible 
to justify as empirically accurate. The reason the assumption is convenient is that there is no simple way to close 
the model without it. 
The efﬁ  cient markets hypothesis says that the prices in stock markets accurately summarize all the informa-
tion that is available about the expectations of the future values of ﬁ  rms. A consequence of this hypothesis is that 
bubbles cannot exist in stock markets – or , if housing is efﬁ  ciently priced, in housing markets. 
The ﬁ  nancial crisis and concomitant economic crisis which we have recently experienced are not possible 
under these two views. Diehard advocates of these views argue that there was no housing bubble, and there is 
currently no involuntary unemployment: those who are unemployed are rationally investing in the search for new 
jobs. Somewhat less militant advocates of these views do not reject the claim that a crisis occurred, but rather con-
struct Ptolemaic arguments purporting to demonstrate that nothing could have been done to prevent it, and that, in 
particular, any aggressive intervention by the state would have then or will now only make things worse.
My own take is that the hold these views have on macro-economists demonstrates that economics is not yet a 
science. For a theory to be a science, it must be falsiﬁ  able. I do not see how any real event could falsify the main 
tenets of current macro-economic theory, if the current crisis could not. History suggests that individuals who have 
long-held views or methods do not change: we can only hope that a new generation of macro-economists will 
emerge, whose members have the courage and intellectual power to re-construct the theory. With respect to our Page • 12
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topic of inequality, it need hardly be said that so-called fresh-water macro – that practiced in the mid-west of the 
United States near the Great Lakes -- takes no particular interest in inequality. One of its tenets is what I called the 
futility thesis – that any attempt by the state to redress inequality would only make things worse.
There has also been an important transformation in micro-economic theory during the past thirty years, and 
although less noted, it may be just as important as the rational-expectations revolution in macroeconomics, for our 
views on inequality. Economists have long realized that markets perform two functions: they coordinate economic 
activity, and they provide incentives for the development of skills and innovations. It is not easy to give a deﬁ  nition 
which distinguishes precisely between these two functions, but there is no question that a conceptual distinction 
exists. 
Let me give two examples. An important problem facing Soviet planners was called the transportation prob-
lem. There are a number of plants in the nation which produce steel, with various ﬁ  xed capacities, and a number 
of locations in the nation which demand steel – in various quantities. There is a cost of shipping steel from any 
supplier to any demander – these costs vary. What is the optimal plan? How much should each steel producer ship 
to each market, so that all demands are satisﬁ  ed, and transportation costs are minimized? This problem led the 
Soviet mathematician L. Kantorovich to co-invent linear programming in the 1940s, for which he and Tjalling 
Koopmans, in the United States, jointly received the Nobel prize in economics.
Competitive prices can solve this problem without linear programming. If competitive prices for transport 
and prices of steel at the various producers characterize this market, then each demander orders steel to minimize 
its costs, the steel market clears, and indeed, the market will have found the mathematical solution to the cost-
minimization problem. This is an example of prices performing a coordinating function.
Consider , now, the problem that I alluded to earlier. A young person is deciding on how much education to 
take, and wishes to maximize a utility function in which both future income and the nature of the occupation are 
important. Prices (which is to say expected wages) guide him/her to make the decision. We should think of this 
as an instance of where the market is performing an incentive function – it is inducing the individual to make a 
choice on which skill to develop based on his self-interest, and if the market is well functioning (competitive), the 
aggregation of all such choices will be Pareto efﬁ  cient. 
Now neither of these examples is pure. Indeed, in the transportation problem, equilibrium prices are realized 
as the result of managers of ﬁ  rms having the incentive, for some reason or other, to minimize costs, and in the 
education example, the market is coordinating the allocation of workers to occupations in a way which is, under 
some assumptions, Pareto efﬁ  cient. And, indeed, in any example, there will be both a coordination and an incentive Page • 13
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interpretation of the market’s role. I maintain, nevertheless, that there is a distinction between these two roles, and 
that each example illustrates different mixes of the coordination and incentive functions of the market.
In the last thirty or forty years, the economic theorist’s view of the market has changed, from being an institu-
tion which performs primarily a coordination function to one that is primarily harnessing incentives. Indeed, the 
old deﬁ  nition of micro-economics was the study of how to allocate scarce resources to competing needs. This is 
entirely a coordination view. The elegant theorem at the pinnacle of this view is that equilibrium prices in a com-
petitive economy with no externalities, no public goods and a complete set of markets will induce an allocation 
of resources which is Pareto efﬁ  cient. That kind of efﬁ  ciency is the mark – perhaps the deﬁ  nition of -- successful 
coordination. The technique that provided the intellectual justiﬁ  cation of the coordination view was general equi-
librium theory: it reached its apex in the 1950s and ‘60s. 
It may surprise you to hear that the phrase ‘principal-agent problem’ was only introduced into economics in 
1973, in an article by Steven Ross. In the principal-agent problem, coordination is not the primary issue – rather, a 
principal must design a contract to extract optimal performance from an agent whose behavior he cannot perfectly 
observe. This is par excellence an incentive problem. 
The technique which developed to analyze incentive problems was game theory – more speciﬁ  cally, parts 
of game theory called contract theory and mechanism-design theory. The problems that are analyzed typically 
involve small numbers of individuals, where markets do not exist, and the individuals must set prices or write 
contracts to ‘get the incentives right.’ But the idea that incentives are the real guiding force which markets must 
address extends to much larger groups of actors – even to entire economies. Some economists have even gone 
so far as to say that prices have no coordinating function at all: rather, they say we should look at all economic 
exchanges as episodes of bargaining between individuals; what determines the price of the exchange is the relative 
power of the two bargainers – in the sense of how scarce the commodity they are each supplying is – and prices 
simply ratify these fundamentals. Under this view, markets do not coordinate at all, they simply provide the venue 
for bargaining. 
Why did this transformation of microeconomic theory occur? This is a fascinating question, and I do not have 
the full answer. A partial answer is that economists sought to explain the economic failure of the centrally planned 
economies, which only began to seriously transpire in the 1960s and 1970s. But the logic here is muddy: cer-
tainly one might conclude that it was the lack of markets that brought about economic failure in those economies. 
But was it because, lacking markets, coordination failed, or because incentives were left unharnessed? There are 
myriad stories of both coordination and incentive failures: coordination failure is illustrated by long queues for Page • 14
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consumer goods, and rationing of industrial inputs, and incentive failure is illustrated by the Soviet joke, told by 
workers about managers, “They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work.” In other words, one might equally well 
interpret the inefﬁ  ciency of centrally planned economics as illustrating that planners cannot replace the coordina-
tion function of the market, or that lack of market competition makes it impossible to harness incentives. 
What is the import of the change in emphasis of the market’s role for the problem of inequality? I believe it 
is to reënforce the importance of material incentives: more radically, to justify the view that the very high salaries 
and incomes, for those at the top, that have come to characterize capitalist economies in the last thirty years, are 
necessary for efﬁ  ciency. 
To see this, I propose a simple thought experiment. Suppose that there were an economy where individuals 
cared only about the kind of occupation in which they engaged, and the amount of education they required to 
qualify for the occupation. Assume that there is a variety of preferences in the population over occupations and 
education. Wages are not important to people, as long as they sufﬁ  ce to purchase a certain minimum of consump-
tion. There is one ﬁ  rm, which produces a single consumption good that everyone needs, and the ﬁ  rm can produce 
this good using many different possible combinations of workers employed in the various occupations. The ﬁ  rm 
wishes to maximize its proﬁ  ts, which will equal the revenues from selling the output to consumer-workers, minus 
the wage costs of the workers. A vector of occupational wages, and a price for the output good, comprise a com-
petitive equilibrium for this economy if, at those wages and prices, all the occupational labor markets clear and 
indeed the demands for workers in the various occupations put forth by the ﬁ  rm, maximize its possible proﬁ  ts at 
those wages and price. 
Now the peculiar thing about this economy is that workers do not care about wages: they make decisions about 
what occupation to engage in solely by looking at the attributes of the occupations and the educational require-
ments to enter them. Each worker chooses the occupation and concomitant educational level which maximizes 
his utility over the available choices. Equilibrium wages are ones which will direct the proﬁ  t-maximizing ﬁ  rm to 
demand exactly the supplies of occupations which are on offer by the population.
I propose that in this economy, the market is providing primarily a coordination function.Granted, the ﬁ  rm has, 
by hypothesis, an incentive to maximize proﬁ  ts: but in some sense the main function of the market is to coordinate 
the ﬁ  xed occupational choices of workers with the ﬁ  rm’s demands for workers in the various occupations.Some 
workers will, indeed, earn more than others at the equilibrium, because their wages are higher: but, by hypothesis, 
as long as all wages are sufﬁ  ciently high with respect to the price of the output, these wages form no part of work-
ers’ decisions.Page • 15
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Suppose one now imposed a purely redistributive income tax on workers. (It may be hard to see why one might 
wish to do so, if workers do not care about their consumption levels, but this is a thought experiment.) Then the 
occupational choices of workers will be unchanged. Indeed, the equilibrium wages and price of output will not 
change. All workers will choose exactly the occupations they chose before, and the ﬁ  rm will produce the same 
amount of output as before, with the same proﬁ  ts: all that will happen is a redistribution of the consumption good 
among worker-consumers. This is a case where redistributive taxation has no effects on occupational and produc-
tive choices. There are no efﬁ  ciency consequences to taxation.
Consider, now, the polar opposite model, where workers care only about income and the education they must 
endure to qualify for different occupations. They do not take into consideration the characteristics of occupations 
at all. A wage vector will still allocate workers to different occupations, but this time the nature of the occupation 
is unimportant for workers – the wage makes it possible for them to optimize their trade-off between income and 
time-consuming education. Here, wages are providing an important incentive function, and workers will choose 
different occupations only because they have different degrees of antipathy towards education, or to time lost from 
earning income while going to school. If we introduce an income tax, occupational choices will change: indeed, 
there may be considerable real effects on occupational structure if the tax is sufﬁ  ciently large, and it might be that 
a considerable number of workers are made worse off than before. In a word, redistribution is no longer costless.
The punch line I am proposing is this: to the extent that the market is primarily a device for coordination, taxa-
tion can redistribute income without massive efﬁ  ciency costs. But if the market is primarily a device for harnessing 
incentives, the efﬁ  ciency costs of redistribution may be high. I believe that the transformation in micro-economic 
theory that I have described – one that views the market primarily has harnessing incentives, as opposed to coor-
dinating – provides an important intellectual foundation for the inadvisability of interfering with markets rewards 
via a redistributionsist state policy. Page • 16
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4.  Ideological strategies
  If one is to mount a serious challenge to the growing inequality that concerns us all, one must have a 
sound intellectual foundation. Indeed, I would say that the success of the conservative tide in the United States is in 
large part a consequence of the successful intellectual work that the right-wing has engaged in since the mid-1970s. 
The right-wing took theory seriously. In the 1970s, a number of right-wing think tanks were formed: the Cato Insti-
tute, Manhattan Institute, and Heritage Foundation. The American Enterprise Institute and the Hoover Foundation 
had been founded earlier – in 1943 and 1919 respectively. The Mont Pelerin Society had its ﬁ  rst American meeting 
in 1958, and brought Friedrich Hayek to the University of Chicago. (Incidentally, his salary at Chicago was paid 
for ten years by private right-wing money, and when that grant lapsed, Chicago released him.)
Right-wing foundations – Scaife, Olin, and Bradley – deliberately undertook the strategy of creating these 
think tanks in the 1970s to counter what they considered to be the left-wing bias of academia, in large part the 
consequence of the transformation of ideas of students and intellectuals during the Civil Rights Movement and 
Vietnam war. Their function was to create a sound conservative ideology, with the following tenets: that freedom 
is possible only under laissez-faire, that governments are corrupt and inefﬁ  cient, and that interference with markets 
is always bad for economic welfare. These ideas were promulgated through the media, in many publications, and 
by providing expert testimony to legislators. Since the television and newspaper media are typically owned by 
wealthy interests, they were surely not indifferent to helping propagate these ideas. The Fox News Network is only 
the latest and most vulgar example of this collaboration.
While liberal, and in some cases, left-wing ideology did develop in the social sciences in the United States – 
with the exception of economics, where the trend has been, as I have indicated, primarily to the right – the left did 
not produce a public presence as formidable as the right. In particular, Ronald Reagan was a wonderful spokes-
man for the right, and he also performed what in hindsight was probably the critical move in demoralizing the 
labor movement, by ﬁ  ring 11,000 federally employed air trafﬁ  c controllers during their 1981 strike. Strike action 
in the US decreased markedly after this event, and trade-union membership is now below 10% in the private sec-
tor. In contrast, Canada’s union density, which was the same as that in the US in 1960, has remained at the same 
level, slightly above 30%. Reagan’s action against the air controllers was only part of the Republican strategy of 
turning a blind eye to employer intimidation of unions, or of workers trying to organize unions, which has been Page • 18
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instrumental. As unions were the main, if inadequate, schools for solidarity of the American working-class, their 
disappearance has left workers more vulnerable to the individualistic and anti-state, anti-tax ideology of the right.
Following my introductory list of key arguments for inequality, I think that there are three key ideas that we 
must address, to provide a sound intellectual basis for advocacy of a more equal society – and as you can see, I 
think that this intellectual task is of utmost importance. Ideas really do trickle down, even if money does not! We 
must argue:
First, that children should not be disadvantaged by the bad luck of being born into a poor or poorly educated 
family. I believe that there is considerable support for this idea in the advanced democracies – but often the conse-
quences of view have not been thoroughly understood by citizens, or implemented in policy. Consider education, 
for example. In the United States, the average amount of state (federal, state, municipal) funding for the education 
of advantaged children is far greater than for disadvantaged children. A moderate liberal goal is to equalize funding 
for all children. But the correct policy is to invest more state funds in disadvantaged children than in advantaged 
ones, to compensate them for their family’s lack of resources. To the extent that disadvantaged children are of a 
minority race or a minority nationality, it is more difﬁ  cult to win citizens to this implementation of the require-
ments of equal opportunity, due to racism and anti-immigrant sentiment. Intellectually, winning this battle means 
confronting Nozick’s libertarianism, and in particular the tenet that a person has a right to beneﬁ  t from his or her 
good luck in the birth lottery.
A more radical view, that I also hold, is that we must extend the compensation to include genetic bad luck. 
There is no reason, from the ethical viewpoint, that individuals who are less mentally endowed should have poorer 
material conditions than the better endowed. To the extent that this occurs, it can only be excused by the necessity 
of incentive payments to wage earners and the infeasibility of redistribution. There is no ethical basis for it, for 
such a basis can only exist by advocating the right to beneﬁ  t from good luck.
Secondly, we must understand the true division of labor in the market’s coordination and incentive roles. I 
think this is, intellectually, the most difﬁ  cult problem and probably the most politically important one. What I 
here propose is a question for research, rather than an answer. As I said earlier, I believe that the degree to which 
redistribution is feasible with small efﬁ  ciency costs is closely related to how important material incentives are for 
productive activity. Although economic theory has shifted on this question during the last generation, it is far from 
obvious that the shift is empirically justiﬁ  ed – by which I mean, we do not know that the market’s role in incentive 
provision is as important as current economic theory contends.Page • 19
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My current view is that material incentives are important for the great majority of workers, in their role in 
directing educational and occupational choices, but that they are far less important for the high ﬂ  iers at the top of 
the income and wealth distribution, and indeed for innovation. I do not mean that the high ﬂ  iers and innovators do 
not like their huge incomes, but rather that these incomes are not socially necessary, in the sense that we would 
lose innovation and good corporate management without them. 
Let me outline some details of my view. Many people think that the high incomes paid to corporate manage-
ment, and in particular to those in the ﬁ  nancial sector, are due to monopolistic elements – back-scratching among 
interlocking directorates of ﬁ  rms made possible by shareholder apathy, for example. I do not endorse this view; I 
believe it is entirely possible that the high salaries and bonuses these people receive are competitive, in the sense 
that each is receiving his expected marginal product as evaluated by the board that hires him. Even if this is not so, 
and those monopolistic elements do exist, I will make my argument under the competitive assumption, because it 
makes the argument stronger. In other words, I claim that even if CEO salaries are competitive, they are inefﬁ  cient. 
Their existence is a market failure.
The theoretical argument for the possibility that these salaries are competitive is that, if you are the pilot of a 
very large ship in Arctic waters, a very small change you make in the angle of the rudder can signiﬁ  cantly affect 
the probability of the ship’s impact with an iceberg. If you are the CEO of a large corporation, with $10 billion 
in annual revenues, a very small difference in the quality of your decisions may make a 1% difference in annual 
revenues, which is to say a $100 million difference. If the hiring board is convinced that you are just slightly better 
than the next candidate, you can probably bargain for $25 million or so of your $100 million marginal product, 
or maybe more. Empirically, we note that the market for management of CEOs of American ﬁ  rms is international 
– much less so than the market for management of Japanese ﬁ  rms or even continental European ﬁ  rms. This is an 
indication that the US market is more competitive than these other markets. I suggest that the truth may be that US 
CEOs are receiving their marginal products and European CEOs are receiving less than their marginal products (as 
are, a fortiori, Japanese CEOs), due to social custom and, perhaps, popular opposition to obscenely high salaries 
in these societies.
But the payment of these high salaries is inefﬁ  cient because, even if the expected marginal product of the 
incumbent CEO is $100 million greater than the next best candidate, the social costs of creating a class with such 
huge wealth are large. First, the institution creates a class which has great power to inﬂ  uence politics. Members of 
this class, if private campaign ﬁ  nancing is legal, will make large contributions to political parties to maintain their 
privileges. Secondly, as we have seen in the ﬁ  nancial sector, paying such huge salaries on the basis of expected Page • 20
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marginal product can induce behavior that is far too risky from the social viewpoint. This negative externality is 
not internalized by the ﬁ  rm, because, inter alia, of the implicit insurance provided by the state against failure in 
the case of a bad outcome on these risky gambles. This is why the US government’s allowing Lehman Bros. to go 
bankrupt in September 2008 so scared the ﬁ  nancial sector, and why the government effectively reversed itself a 
few days later by rescuing the insurance ﬁ  rm AIG. 
Notice that this argument differs from the one given by a ﬁ  nancial mogul, who explained that his ﬁ  rm contin-
ued to engage in the risky behavior that led to the crisis by saying “As long as the music plays, we have to continue 
to dance.” That cute explanation suggests that the big Wall Street ﬁ  rms were in an inefﬁ  cient Nash equilibrium. 
My argument, in contrast, is that they may have been in an efﬁ  cient Nash equilibrium – as long as they all failed 
together they would all be rescued. Thus, the behavior was efﬁ  cient from the viewpoints of the players – private 
gains on the upside of the gamble, and socialization of losses on the downside. The fact that 2010 has been a ban-
ner year for the Wall Street banking houses indicates that they have done quite well out of the crisis, thank you.
My ﬁ  nal argument is that the most important reward for the very high ﬂ  iers is not money income, but power – 
power over others, and the respect of their peers. If these high salaries were taxed at very high rates, I do not think 
we would see a signiﬁ  cant change in productive behavior. (One might have to make the taxation international, to 
prevent migration.) What other occupation could these high ﬂ  iers choose which would give them the same power 
and respect of their peers? Will they, alternatively, be satisﬁ  ed to retire and play golf or read poetry? 
I have argued that these high incomes are inefﬁ  cient, because of risk-taking externalities that they induce, that 
they are unnecessary for incentive provision, and that they create a class with disproportionate political power. 
Finally, there is the very important negative externality of the creation of a social ethos which worships wealth. 
Ordinary people lose self-esteem, and do what they can to ape the consumption behavior of the very wealthy. 
In sum, the positive social value of the institution of extremely high salaries that the leaders of the corporate 
world, and in particular, of the ﬁ  nancial sector, receive, is a big lie. It may well be a competitive outcome, but it 
is a market failure which could be corrected by regulation or legislation. In the US, at least, there are no visible 
prospects for such legislation, and I maintain that this is due, in no small part, to the hold of the incentive argument 
for inequality on the voting population.
I believe, in contrast, that incentive pay for the working population in general is important. The experience of 
China since 1979 is an example: I do not attribute the Chinese growth rate of over 8% per annum in this period en-
tirely to the lack of coordination which existed prior to 1979 due to the absence of markets. On the other hand, I do 
not think that material incentives, especially in the wealthier countries, are as important as many economists insist. Page • 21
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We see a very large difference in relative material rewards to skilled labor across the advanced democracies – at its 
most extreme, between the Nordic countries and the United States – without concomitant efﬁ  ciency differences. 
Once basic needs are met, I believe that people put substantial weight on the nature of their work. Now, European 
workers have chosen to work substantially less than American workers, which may well be a reaction to high taxes. 
But I have never heard a conservative economist argue that people should vote for low taxes, for otherwise they 
will choose to spend more time on family vacations.
 Most of the people in this room could increase their income by changing occupations, but we do not, because 
we think our work is important, or we ﬁ  nd it interesting. Cuba, apparently, produces the best physician corps in 
Latin America, although its doctors are not well paid. . The social provision of good education turns out to be much 
more important than high physician salaries in generating a supply of capable physicians. The Soviet Union had 
no dearth of doctors, or mathematicians, although these occupations received smaller material incomes than some 
skilled manual workers. 
So although material incentives are important for ordinary workers, they are probably the least important for 
those workers who pay signiﬁ  cant taxes in market economies – namely, those whose incomes are high, and have 
interesting careers. If my conjecture is correct, there would be no major impediments to substantial redistribution, 
on account of incentive problems.
Thirdly, I believe that we must counter the view that the state is inefﬁ  cient. This is, I think, a particularly Amer-
ican view, so it is probably not appropriate to spend much time on it here. Let me just mention one anecdote. In 
November 2010, Gregory Mankiw, a conservative Harvard economist, formerly in the Bush administration, wrote 
a column in the business section of the New York Times in which he gave this argument for keeping income taxes 
low. High-paid actors might make fewer ﬁ  lms if they were more highly taxed, and economists like him might give 
fewer public lectures for which they are paid high fees. Thus, there would be a social loss resulting from higher 
taxation on high ﬂ  iers. Not once in the article did Mankiw mention that, with those taxes, we could build more 
bridges and perhaps even high-speed rail. That’s because, in the conservative American view today, government 
productivity is zero. Page • 22
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5.  Current American politics
Many people believed that the 2008 election of Barack Obama signaled a sea change in American politics, the 
end of the political pendulum’s swing to right. Conventional political science predicted that the Republican Party 
would move towards the center. But the opposite happened: the Republican Party has moved to the right. At the 
time of the election, two-thirds of the populace supported health care reform, but by the time the bill was passed 
over a year later, barely one-half did. The insurance companies and the Republican Party succeeded in turning 
about 20% of the populace against the reform, relying principally upon two arguments: that a government-run 
health service was an infringement of freedom, and that for the average household costs would increase without 
any concomitant increase in the quality of care. 
The fact that most of the claims of the opponents were lies is not the main point; rather, we must ask, why were 
so many vulnerable to them, and why did the Democrats, and Obama in particular, not succeed in challenging the 
lies more effectively?
I believe that the narrative of self-interest, which has been so carefully nurtured by the right-wing think tanks, 
was of key importance. The Democrats did not argue, as I believe they should have, that it was a travesty of justice 
that the richest country in the world left 44 million of its citizens uninsured. They did not argue that social solidar-
ity required this legislation. Indeed, the right-wing Fox news commentator Glenn Beck, perhaps anticipating such 
an argument, said that when you hear someone speak of social justice, that’s a code word for socialism. Many in 
the United States have come to believe that unbridled self-interest is ethically ﬁ  ne, in part because, via the invis-
ible hand, it is said to have such wonderful consequences. There had been, in the original health-care reform bill, 
a so-called public option, federally provided insurance that would compete with private insurance. But this was 
dropped from the bill, because conservative Democrats did not support it. Whether this was because they were 
beholden to insurance companies for campaign ﬁ  nance, or because their constituents opposed it as creeping social-
ism, I am unsure. The watered-down bill eventually passed, but with not one Republican legislator voting for it in 
either the Senate or the House of Representatives.
With regard to capping salaries of the two big investment bankers, Obama said, “I know both these guys, they 
are savvy businessmen. I , like most of the American people, don’t begrudge people’s success or wealth. That is 
part of the free market system.” My suspicion is that Obama does not believe what he said; but the fact that he said 
it is indicative of the American ethos which he believed he must play to. The Dodd-Frank bill, regulating the ﬁ  nan-
cial sector, which passed during the summer of 2010, is an inadequate instrument, which even centrists say will not Page • 24
John E. Roemer
prevent another ﬁ  nancial crisis. Perhaps this was the best that Obama could do given the balance of political forces. 
One must recall that he appointed Lawrence Summers, architect of banking deregulation under Bill Clinton, as his 
economic guru – again, perhaps indicating the political power of ﬁ  nance in the United States at present.
In 2001, President George W. Bush enacted temporary income tax cuts, which were to expire at the end of 
2010. Making these cuts temporary was evidently the most he could hope to do at that time. The Republican Party, 
newly empowered after the mid-term elections of November 2010, demanded to extend these cuts permanently. 
The Obama administration initially agreed to extend them for the bottom 98% of income earning households, but 
to allow the cuts to expire for households with income over $250,000 per annum. Allowing those cuts to expire 
would pay for the envisioned deﬁ  cit in the social security fund three times over. But, in the last days of December 
2010, the administration caved in, under threat that if it did not, the Republicans would refuse to extend federal 
unemployment insurance to those who had been unemployed more than 99 weeks. In other words, Obama, an ap-
parently liberal president, believed that he could not make the Republicans take the blame for refusing to support 
the unemployed should he not give in on the absurd right-wing demand to maintain reduced taxes on the wealthy; 
rather, should he hold the line on taxing the wealthy, popular approval would turn against him for not supporting 
the unemployed. The lesson here is not mainly that Barack Obama is personally weak: it is, rather, what his politi-
cal calculation tells us about the ideological stance of the voting population.
Franklin D. Roosevelt was a centrist governor from the state of New York, when he was elected president in 
1932. But by 1936, he was saying this:
For twelve years this Nation was afﬂ  icted with hear-nothing, see-nothing, do-nothing Government. The 
Nation looked to Government but the Government looked away. Nine mocking years with the golden calf 
and three long years of the scourge! Nine crazy years at the ticker and three long years in the breadlines! 
Nine mad years of mirage and three long years of despair! Powerful inﬂ  uences strive today to restore that 
kind of government with its doctrine that that Government is best which is most indifferent1.
Those same powerful forces are at work today in the United States, but one can hardly imagine Barack Obama 
speaking as FDR did. Those powerful forces have become even more so in the past thirty years. In the period 
1977-2007, 57% of the economic growth of the United States went to the richest 1% of households: in after – tax 
accounts, over 40% went to these households. It is this massive increase in inequality which lies behind the right-
wing movement in American politics today – abetted by racism which has enraged a segment of the white popula-
tion with the election of a black president. The Tea Party movement, despite its popular and mass nature, has been 
ﬁ  nanced by big right-wing money. It is hard to say whether it will be a ﬂ  ash in the pan, but its present existence is 
1  Speech at Madison Square Garden, October 31, 1936.Page • 25
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indicative of the social ethos. That a political party which openly supports the economic interests of the wealthiest 
2% of the population, against those of the great majority, can nevertheless garner the support of approximately 
one-half of the voters is the sign of a dangerous situation.Page • 26
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6.  What can we do? 
My view, too, was that the Republican Party, after its defeat in the 2008 election, would gravitate towards 
the center. This, after all, is the logic of political competition in normal times. Evidently, these are not normal 
times. The conjunction of a right-wing, anti-tax, individualistic ethos, a hugely enriched class at the top of wealth 
distribution, an economic crisis, and a black president in a country where the racism from slave times, although 
much reduced, still exists, has brought about an abnormal dynamic. If we continue on this trajectory, there will be 
inadequate state ﬁ  nancing to improve the deteriorating American educational system, and to rebuild our crumbling 
infrastructure. The real incomes of the majority of households will continue to decline, and the American social 
fabric will become even more frayed. The US will compete, less and less effectively, with China and the other 
developing nations who are replacing it as the manufacturing center. American xenophobia will increase, and in-
ternational tensions will rise. The world will fail to address global warming, because the American right-wing has 
convinced many that the threat is a hoax; their motive for doing so, I conjecture, is that addressing the problem 
would require state intervention, which they abhor. 
Most social scientists who study inequality have focused upon measuring its degree, and studying the micro 
mechanisms through which it is produced. Micro mechanisms include a substantial variety of processes: how 
tax policy contributes to the distribution of wealth, how the intergenerational transmission of income and wealth 
occur, what role education plays or could play in modifying the distribution of income, how neighborhoods and 
social networks affect behavior and choices which have an impact on distribution. 
Of course we must understand these processes. But in a sense, I think understanding them is of secondary 
importance, with regard to the massively important phenomenon of increasing inequality in the advanced democ-
racies. I believe that democracy works in the advanced countries, in the sense that policies can only survive if 
they are approved by the majority (or a substantial fraction) of the electorate. Now the electorate may have poor 
information, or may have learned an ideology which does not serve its true interests, or may subscribe to a social 
ethos which prizes a kind of de jure individual freedom over a secure livelihood, but in the end, the electorate must 
acquiesce to social policy in our advanced democracies. This is surely one great accomplishment of the political 
revolutions that began in 1776 and 1789. 
Today, I think the most important problem for the social science of inequality is understanding how elector-
ates have come to acquiesce to policies which increase inequality, and to try and reverse this acquiescence. To an 
extent, revealing the logic of the micro mechanisms is one strategy for doing so. A second strategy is the philo-Page • 28
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sophical one, of arguing that justice requires equality – the last 40 years in political philosophy have seen a lively 
debate about exactly what kind of, and how much of that kind of equality, is required. A third strategy is show-
ing how the inequality-increasing policies that electorates have agreed to have been aggressively advocated and 
proselytized by the wealthy, in order to maintain their material privileges. This work is mainly done by historians 
and some political scientists. A fourth strategy is critiquing the social ethos of individualism and greed which has 
grown immensely since the second world war: the ethos to replace it is one of solidarity. This strategy overlaps 
with the third one, since (I believe) the nurturing of the individualistic ethos has been a conscious strategy of the 
wealthy, and perhaps its most powerful weapon. Finally, I believe, as I have said, that we must do the research to 
challenge the view that interfering with the incentives the market provides necessarily reduces economic welfare. 
Of course, this list is incomplete. I hope others add to it. We must become more imaginative academic entre-
preneurs. We must not be afraid of being old-fashioned, when we advocate a solidaristic world view. It has become 
fashionable to say the Enlightenment is dead, and that social democracy is passé. I militantly oppose these claims. 
The Enlightenment provided the theoretical basis for political democracy and the importance of science, and so-
cial democracy is the one great success of the solidaristic ethos which has survived the twentieth century into the 
twenty ﬁ  rst. As the ﬁ  ne, recently deceased historian Tony Judt wrote, to the extent that we forget this heritage, ill 
fares the land.
We, a gathering of those most concerned with inequality in academia today, are facing a situation where we 
must move from describing the phenomenon we study, to ﬁ  guring out how to bring evidence to bear against the 
ideology which foments it. That ideology has created a monster, capable of inﬂ  icting truly disastrous consequences 
on civilization. Because theory and ideas are our métier, we have a vital role to play.Page • 29
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